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DIVISIBLE DIVORCE AND RIGHTS TO SUPPORT,
PROPERTY AND CUSTODY
JOAN M. KRAUSKOPF*
Some may praise the phenomenon as a marvelous example of the
law's elasticity and adaptability to changing society; others may con-
demn it as gross expediency or capricious judge-made law. Whether
one praises or blames, the area of marriage and divorce law is an ex-
cellent illustration of legal concepts formulated and applied because
of the events and accidents of history and the practical necessities of
the times.
It takes only a brief glance into legal history to confirm that most
of our concepts concerning marriage and divorce stem from the early
times when the Church in England and its ecclesiastical courts had
complete control of marriage as a religious matter.' The Protestant
Reformation led to control by temporal bodies and the notion that these
were temporal matters. And hard on the heels of the Reformation came
the philosophies of liberalism and enlightenment which propounded
each person's right to pursue happiness. For a fleeting moment mar-
riage was thought of as no more than a civil contract to be repudiated
freely by either party if it interfered with his happiness. The pressure
for governmental regulation of marriage and family relations quickly
altered that idea to one more in accord with our present concepts.
Marriage as only a civil contract between man and wife would have left
government with no control over what was considered to be the basic
unit of society, the family. During the nineteenth century courts and
writers formed the now-familiar conclusions that marriage was a social
institution, a status, a res in which the state had an interest. By 1888
the idea was clearly expressed:
[W]hilst marriage is often termed by text writers and in decisions
of courts a civil contract . . . it is something more than a mere
contract. . . . It is an institution, in the maintenance of which in
its purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of
the family and of society, without which there would be neither
civilization nor progress.2
Bishop, in his treatise on marriage and divorce, stretched the
status idea of the marriage relationship to that of a res, and it was the
* Lecturer, School of Law, University of Missouri.
1 See Rheinstein, "Trends in Marriage and Divorce Law of Western Countries," 18
Law and Contemp. Prob. 3 (1953).
2 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-211 (1888).
346
DIVISIBLE DIVORCE
Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff which, in dicta, cited his work and
thereby crystallized the concept.3
In the twentieth century we find the struggle to categorize the
marriage relation disappearing. In its place appears a frank recognition
that the exigencies of the times are the determining factors in solving
marriage and divorce problems. In Williams I the Court did not need
the artificial support of holding that the marriage status is a res, but
instead expounded upon the practical necessities of a state being able to
control the marital affairs of its domiciliaries:
[I] t does not aid in the solution of the problem presented by this
case to label these proceedings as proceedings in rem. Such a suit,
however, is not a mere in personam action. . . . Hence, the decrees
in this case, like other divorce decrees, are more than in personam
judgments. They involve the marital status of the parties. Domicile
creates a relationship to the state which is adequate for numerous
exercises of state power. Each state as a sovereign has a rightful
and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled
within its borders. The marriage relation creates problems of large
social importance. Protection of offspring, property interests, and
the enforcement of marital responsibilities are but a few of com-
manding problems in the field of domestic relations with which the
state must deal.4
Much as it frustrates our ivory-towered hearts, it must be accepted that
a definitive analysis of what marriage really is has not been made and
is not needed. Perhaps we must be content knowing that the law in this
area has always moved toward that solution which will further govern-
mental control and protection of marital relationships. We have no
reason to doubt that conflict of laws problems will be settled by solu-
tions which enhance a state's control over marital relations within its
boundaries. We saw that when Williams I held that a state in which
one spouse is domiciled could end the marital relation ex parte for the
purposes of remarriage and legitimacy and that all other states must
give full faith and credit to that action. But what of other purposes?
The movement has been in the same direction, and the accidents of
history and the pragmatic pressures of the period are equally influen-
tial there.
RIGHT TO SUPPORT
The only divorce recognized by the ecclesiastical courts was the
divorce a mensa et thoro, its modern day equivalent being a legal sep-
aration. At that time a married man had complete control of his wife's
3 Bishop, Marriage and Divorce § 156 (4th ed. 1864); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 US.
714, 735 (1878).
4 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297-298 (1942).
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property and income. Since the divorce a mensa et thoro in no way dis-
solved the bonds of matrimony, his exclusive control continued. To
prevent the separated wife from becoming a public charge, the court
had to order the husband to support her.5 When a judicial divorce
a vinculo, severing the marital relationship entirely, was authorized by
the English statute of 1857, it also authorized the courts to order former
husbands to support their former wives.6 Of course, if the wife had any
property or income, it would in this situation have been available to her
for support. But what of the woman with no property or whose prop-
erty the husband had dissipated? In a case soon after the passage of
the statute, the judge stated that the legislature had intended that the
wife should not have to seek her remedy of divorce at the expense of
being left destitute.7 In other words, the legislature permitted an en-
tirely new situation, a man no longer married having to support his ex-
wife, for the same basic reason that the ecclesiastical courts had ordered
support: to keep the woman from becoming a pauper. Nearly all the
states in this country have somewhat similar statutes.
It is interesting that when ordering alimony or support payments,
courts seldom analyze why they do so. Most of them parrot that there
is a duty of support arising out of the marital relation.' Their language
indicates that this is a duty which has existed from the very day the
marriage was contracted. However, the correlative right to support has
never had an adequate remedy at any time while the couple lived to-
gether. Other than trying to charge necessaries to her husband's ac-
count, there is nothing a woman can do to force her husband to support
her so long as she lives with him. The fact that they are alive and are
living together is treated as irrefutable proof that he is supporting her.'
The husband determines in every way what shall constitute this so-
called right of support. It is not until a separation or divorce ensues
that the wife may obtain any judicial enforcement of the right. Crozier
put it well when she wrote: "Whatever tendency there is toward the
right of support becoming a definite right to some definite thing is not
in marriage but in separation and divorce."" What kind of right is this
5 Mathewson v. Mathewson, 79 Conn. 23, 63 Ati. 285 (1906); Madden, Persons and
Domestic Relations §§ 97-98 (1931); Jacobs & Goebel, Cases on Domestic Relations 378
(3d ed. 1952).
6 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, § 32 (1857), as discussed in Madden, op. cit. supra note 5.
7 Fisher v. Fisher, 2 Swab. & T. 410 (1861), as discussed in Madden, ibid.
8 Oarlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939); Whitebird v. Luckey,
180 Okla. 1, 67 P.2d 775 (1937).
9 McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953); Crozier, "Marital
Support," Selected Essays on Family Law 831, 834 (1950); Paulsen, "Support Rights and
Duties Between Husband and Wife," 9 Vand. L. Rev. 709, 719 (1956).
10 Crozier, supra note 9, at 838.
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that "arises from the marriage" but has no remedy except when the
marriage fails? The answer is the same as in the time of the ecclesiasti-
cal courts. Although one occasionally finds reference to damages or a
dividing of mutual resources, the major factor is clearly one of protect-
ing the public purse, Even though the divorced wife controls her prop-
erty and is generally more capable of supporting herself than such a
woman 100 years ago, too often the years of marriage have prevented
her from obtaining the skills necessary to earn a living or have caused
her to forget those she once had. Many more divorced women would
be on welfare rolls were it not for alimony payments. An article in the
Milwaukee Journal headlined "Fear of Jail Is Saving Taxpayers
Millions" is an ample illustration. By aiding in the collection of alimony
and support arrearages, the county welfare department in the Milwau-
kee area in a three-year period was reimbursed for one million dollars
it had given to divorced women who had not received their ex-husbands'
payments." Modern alimony is no more than each state affording
financial protection to its ex-wives by imposing upon every man who
enters a marital relationship in that state the possible obligation of sup-
porting the woman when the relationship ends. There is a vague resem-
blance to unemployment compensation in the sense that it is the con-
clusion of a pre-existing relationship whereby one person obtained the
means of supporting himself which gives rise to the "right." In this
respect it is perfectly proper to call it a "right to support." This is not
something in the nature of a "natural" right or a constitutional right,
but a right which owes its existence to statutory authorization, and the
history of which indicates no purpose other than to relieve the state of
the necessity of supporting former wives who cannot support them-
selves. It is the local quality of this right which shapes its course in
conflict of laws problems.
In some states the right to support is an ephemeral right while in
others it has a marked quality of durability. This is why there are con-
flict of laws problems. Most states follow the English example and
authorize the granting of alimony in the same statute which empowers
courts to grant divorces. In a minority of states it is held that support
may be ordered only at the time a separation or divorce decree is
granted. These tend to be old rules not recently challenged. 2 One
reason for such holdings stems from the fact that the ecclesiastical
courts only made support orders at the, time they rendered a separation
decree, and Chancery in taking over their function followed their prac-
tice. Chancery held that it only had power to so order as incidental
1 Milwaukee Journal, Jan. 28, 1960, p. 20, col. 1.
12 See cases collected in Annot., 141 A.L.R. 399 (1942).
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relief along with the divorce decree. This is probably the origin of the
use of the ambiguous phrase "incident of the marriage" to describe
support. Some American courts, since they act as equity courts, follow
this rule of Chancery and hold that they can only order alimony as an
incident of the divorce decree. A second reasoD3 sometimes given is
probably a corruption of the first: support is an "incident" of the
marital relation and cannot be ordered at any time after the marriage
relation itself no longer exists. A last reason is a matter of statutory
interpretation. Since the wording of many of the statutes is that the
court may order support when decreeing divorce, this is interpreted as
limiting the power to do so to that time. Whichever of these reasons is
utilized, the result is a substantive definition of the right of support
which sharply limits its existence to a right enforceable only at the very
time a decree of separation or divorce is granted. 13 Consequently, a
valid ex parte divorce decree obtained by either spouse automatically
ends the right to support. As one writer described it, it is a terminable
interest and the condition subsequent which causes termination oc-
curs.' 4 Perhaps it would be more proper in these states to label this in-
terest a mere possibility or expectancy rather than a right since it is so
ephemeral in nature.' 5
The majority of states interpret the possibility of obtaining support
as a vested personal right which should not be delimited by the absence
of personal jurisdiction over one of the spouses at the time of divorce.
The courts will entertain claims for support after the marital relation is
ended. Many of these rulings also came in old cases. For example, in
1869 the Ohio Supreme Court, in upholding an alimony award to a
woman whose ex-husband had defended against her claim by asserting
his ex parte divorce, said: "It is not essential to the allowance of ali-
mony that the marriage relation should subsist up to the time it is
allowed."' 6 So it is that the concept of "divisible divorce" is an old one
and many, many cases had been disposed of under the theory before
Justice Douglas coined the catchy phrase and thus erroneously re-
ceived the credit or blame for originating the concept.
13 Sims v. Sims, 253 Ala. 307, 45 So. 2d 25 (1950); Hall v. Hall, 141 Ga. 361, 80
S.E. 992 (1914); Shaw v. Shaw, 92 Iowa 722, 61 N.W. 368 (1894); Shain v. Shain, 324
Mass. 603, 88 N.E.2d 143 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1949).
14 Morris, "Divisible Divorce," 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1287 (1951).
15 Query? If these courts do label it a "right," is there not a question as to the con-
stitutionality of their permitting it to be so eliminated even within their own state
borders?
16 Cox v. Cox, 19 Ohio St. 502, 512 (1869). See also Slapp v. Slapp, 143 Ohio St.
105, 54 N.E.2d 153 (1944); Wick v. Wick, 58 Ohio App. 72 (1938); Annot., 141 A.L.R.
399 (1942); Note, 34 Ky. LJ. 149 (1946).
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The phrase was first used in Estin v. Estin.17 There the wife had
obtained a decree of separation and a support order in New York before
the husband established a domicile in Nevada and obtained an ex parte
divorce there. Nevada followed the rule that divorce ends a support
order automatically while the New York court held that a divorce
under these circumstances did not dissolve the support order. The
Supreme Court could hardly have held otherwise than it did: Nevada
had no jurisdiction to affect the personal property interest in the wife
created by the New York judgment without personal jurisdiction over
her. The Nevada decree being void as to the effect on the New York
support order to that extent, it was not entitled to full faith and credit
in New York. Since this holding did not authorize an exception to full
faith and credit on the basis of overriding local policy, it would not
have been necessary for the Court to state why New York's policy was
justified in pursuing enforcement of the support order. However, the
Court did so emphatically: "New York was rightly concerned lest the
abandoned spouse be left impoverished and perhaps become a public
charge. The problem of her livelihood and support is plainly a matter
in which her community had a legitimate interest."' As evidence of
the Court's sympathy with the state's ability to protect itself from hav-
ing to support indigent ex-wives, the statement was the open sesame
for Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt.'0
The primary difference between Estin and Vanderbilt is that in
the latter case, there had been no support order of any kind made
prior to the divorce. The former wife had to be recognized in New York
as a single woman by virtue of the valid ex parte divorce her husband
had obtained in Nevada. When she prayed for separation and alimony
in New York, the court recognized that the marriage was dissolved but
ordered support payments on the theory that the dissolution of the
marriage did not end the former wife's right to support from her former
husband. The Supreme Court decided the case exactly as it had Estin,
brushing off the difference between them as immaterial and assuming
that the wife had a "support right" which could not be cut off without
personal jurisdiction over her. The fact that the Court did not bother
to analyze the nature of this claimed right is compelling evidence of its
predilection to further the state's ability to protect its own domiciliary.
Of course, Douglas, speaking in Esenwein v. Esenwein,20 had given the
17 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
18 Id. at 547.
19 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957).
20 "But I am not convinced that in absence of an appearance or personal service the
decree need be given full faith and credit when it comes to maintenance or support of the
other spouse or the children. The problem under the full faith and credit clause is to ac-
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first indication of this policy's influence upon him. No better example
could be given of the law's accommodation to conflicting interests than
the contrast of Williams I and Vanderbilt which are two sides of the
same coin. It is because of Williams I that Vanderbilt arose and was
decided as it was. Williams I forced recognition of ex parte decrees so
as to further the first state's interest in its domiciliary. Vanderbilt
protects the second state by requiring personal jurisdiction to affect
support rights. The need for such a balance was expressed before
Vanderbilt by a well-known state court justice: "Since the courts have
evolved rules of law that allow the husband readily to obtain a divorce,
corresponding rules of law must be invoked to protect the wife and
prevent injustice."2'
Because of the increasing affluence and mobility of the American
public and the difficulties of disproving domicile in the state which
granted the ex parte decree, one may expect that the problems of di-
visible divorce have not been laid to rest. A perhaps unexpected result
of Vanderbilt may lessen the number of conflicts questions. This is a
possible change in local law among those states which have traditionally
held that the right to support ends with the marriage. In California this
has already occurred. In 1953 in Dimon v. Dimon,2 the California
court held that no support order could be made at any time other than
when divorce or separation was decreed and cited more than fifteen
prior California cases purportedly in accord with its ruling. In 1959 in
Hudson v. Hudson,23 the court specifically overruled prior cases and
held that alimony could be ordered at other times. This opinion is re-
plete with references to Estin and Vanderbilt and even reads as though
the court felt that those cases required this change in local law. Refer-
ing to a case being overruled, the court noted "that case was decided be-
fore the theory of divisible divorce was established in Estin v. Estin,"
and "after the Vanderbilt case," the proposition "that by terminating
the marriage the ex parte divorce automatically terminated all rights,
including the nonadjudicated right to support that grew out of that
marriage . . . cannot be maintained." This opinion was written by
Traynor who dissented admirably in the Dimon case, pointing out the
policy reasons for a local law that support does survive and distin-
commodate as fully as possible the conflicting interests of the two States .... The State
where the deserted wife is domiciled has a deep concern in the welfare of the family de-
serted by the head of the household." Esenwein v. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279, 282 (1945)
(concurring opinion).
21 Justice Traynor dissenting in Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal. 2d 516, 539, 254 P.2d
528, 541 (1953).
22 Dimon v. Dimon, supra note 21.
23 Hudson v. Hudson, 52 Cal. 2d 735, 344 P.2d 295 (1959).
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guishing all the cases cited by the majority. At that time he could not
enlist enough of the court to follow his views. But six years later he
had their unanimous support. The deciding factor was doubtless the
existence of Vanderbilt and the widespread influence of the United
States Supreme Court. Perhaps other Traynors in other states will
bring about similar changes in the local law through a similar "misuse"
of the Supreme Court decision. If so, the paucity of states still holding
that the right to support disappears may eliminate the support issue as
a conflicts problem.
Until it is so eliminated, there is one question which may be pre-
sented to the Supreme Court, a question that will raise the ghost of
Haddock v. Haddock.' Haddock was the controlling case on migratory
divorce before the Williams cases, and its rule was that only an ex parte
divorce decree in the state of the matrimonial domicile was entitled to
full faith and credit. Matrimonial domicile, of course, meant a
state where the couple lived as husband and wife. It was the negation
of this requirement by Williams I that allowed a spouse to obtain a
valid ex parte divorce wherever he chose to establish domicile. In the
Estin case, New York was the matrimonial domicile. In Vanderbilt
the matrimonial domicile had been California, but the wife had moved
to New York before a Nevada divorce was granted to her husband. In
Armstrong v. Armstrong5 the couple resided in Florida but the wife
had established domicile in Ohio before the divorce decree was obtained
in Florida by her husband. In the Armstrong case the Court upheld the
power of Ohio courts to order alimony payments by the husband in an
action instituted after finality of the Florida order dissolving the mar-
riage, because it held that the Florida court had not passed on the ali-
mony question. The four concurring justices, who felt that the Florida
court had adjudicated the alimony question, gave reasons later used by
the majority in Vanderbilt. In neither Vanderbilt nor Armstrong had
the husband and wife resided together in the state which ordered the
ex-husband to support his ex-wife. However, both women came to the
state as a married woman wrapped in her marital status. She could
have obtained a divorce there herself because the marital status was
there with her. Being a domiciliary of the state while married, she had
a "right to support" from her husband within the state. He had a
correlative duty of support enforceable if he ever entered the state.
Furthermore, this right and duty of support would be defined accord-
ing to the local law where the wife was domiciled-a right which sur-
vived divorce in either New York or Ohio. This is why the ex parte
24 Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
25 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
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divorce elsewhere could not prevent later enforcement of support in
the wife's domiciliary state. A far different situation would exist if the
husband obtained the ex parte divorce in a state such as Nevada and
thereafter the ex-wife moved to New York or Ohio. This would pose
the spectacle, not of forum shopping for an easy divorce state but, of
the wife forum shopping for a state where the "right to support" sur-
vives divorce. On similar facts the New York court avoided constitu-
tional issues by holding that the wife did not qualify as a "New York
wife" under the particular wording of the New York statute.26 It is
submitted that to have enforced an order of support against the ex-
husband would have been to violate substantive due process. No state
could force a man to support a woman to whom he had never been
married. Due process requires some logical connection between the per-
son from whom property is taken and the person to whom it is given. The
man who enters a sovereign state government's territory for the first time
as a single man or as a man married to Y can hardly be forced to support
X to whom he has never been married while either of them was in that
state. There would never have been any connection whatsoever between
that state and a marital status of those people. In his dissent in Vander-
bilt, Frankfurter raised this problem as one of his objections to the de-
cision,2 7 and Harlan also dissented, saying: "In such a case New York
could not pretend to be assuring the wife the mere survival of a pre-
existing right, because the wife could have had no pre-divorce rights in
New York at all ..... .[A] t the time of the divorce New York would
have had no interest in the situation of any kind."2 Even Traynor,
while arguing for divisible divorce, said that the wife would not be
allowed "by migrating to another state, to revive a right that had
expired."29
If due process prevents some states from enforcing a support
order against the ex-husband, what states will be permitted to do so?
It is not the state in which the ex-wife is domiciled when she seeks the
order. Therein lies the ghost of Haddock v. Haddock. Rather, it is
the state where the wife was domiciled at the time of the divorce and,
perhaps, the state of matrimonial domicile at the time the parties first
lived apart. No other state would have a sufficient nexus with this
marriage to justify the supposition that the husband had a duty of sup-
port within it. Therefore, the due process decision should obviate any
consideration of the full faith and credit problem.
26 Loeb v. Loeb, 4 N.Y.2d 542, 152 N.E.2d 36 (1958), noted in 20 Ohio St. L.J. 140
(1959).
27 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra note 19, at 425.
28 Id. at 433-434.
29 Dimon v. Dimon, supra note 21.
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However, a court wishing to avoid the due process issue could dis-
pose of this problem by a choice of law approach. Since the enforce-
able right to support, even in states where it survives divorce, originates
at the time of legal separation or divorce, the court could refer to the
state which had the most substantial contact with the wife at that
time. For example, if the divorce were obtained in Nevada while the
wife resided in Pennsylvania and she is now before the Ohio court seek-
ing a support order, the Ohio court would give full faith and credit to
the Nevada decree insofar as it dissolved the marriage but not insofar
as it may have affected personal rights elsewhere. The court would
then look to the law of Pennsylvania to determine whether or not the
wife had a right to support. Since support does not survive divorce in
Pennsylvania, she would not.30 On either due process or choice of law
approaches, we have reached the point where the state's interest in pro-
tecting its domiciliary from the welfare rolls is not enough to warrant
enforced support payments from an ex-husband.
RIGHTS IN PROPERTY
The granting of a divorce decree in itself has no effect on the title
to most property owned individually or in common by a married couple
since such ownership is independent of the marriage relationship. Even
in community property states, the statutes usually provide that the
court must specifically order the division of property upon divorce. 31
At the other extreme are possibilities of obtaining property because
of the marriage relationship. The possibility of inheriting a spouse's
property or of obtaining pension payments upon his death are so uni-
versally considered to be mere expectancies that they are of little
concern to us.3" These are not in the nature of recognized property
interests and unquestionably disappear with the end of the marriage.
Only interests equivalent to common-law dower or curtesy which
could be affected by operation of law when a divorce is decreed might
create divisible divorce problems. Although there is now wide variety
among the states in the nature of these interests,' they tend to be similar
in that they come into existence by operation of law when a marriage
is created and are often labeled "incidents" of the marriage. To this
30 Query whether it would enforce a right to support if it found she had such a right
elsewhere? Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 458 (1934) says that no state will directly
enforce a duty of support created by the law of another state because it is a matter of
peculiarly local policy.
31 2 Vernier, American Family Laws § 101 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Vernier].
32 Ostrander v. Preece, 129 Ohio St. 625, 196 N.E. 670 (1935), appeal dismissed, 296
U.S. 543 (1935).
33 2 Powell, The Law of Real Property § 217 (1962 cum. supp.).
1963]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
extent they resemble the right to support. However, there should be
little litigation of conflict of laws questions in this area. Unlike support,
it is clear that the interest of the absent spouse does not depend upon
domicile but upon the location of the land. Only the law of the state
where the divorce is granted and the law of the state where the land is
situated could be involved. Since there is a long-established and uni-
versal rule that the determination of interests in land is controlled by
the law of the state where the land is located, it is that law which will
determine what effect an ex parte divorce granted there or elsewhere
will have on the interests.34 There will be no forum shopping for a state
which might recognize the interest. Moreover, the law has already
been well-developed that no court has the power to affect interests in
land by operation of law unless the land is subject to its jurisdiction. 3
In the face of these cases, one would hardly expect a Nevada court to
attempt to affect ex parte interests in land located in another state.
An additional factor which should tend to lessen the problems of
divisible divorce in this area is that these interests in the land of the
other spouse are ordinarily considered to be inchoate until his death.36
They are more similar to the so-called "right to inherit" than to the
right of support. The fact that they may be mere possibilities rather
than rights would not enable the divorcing state to affect them
extraterritorially, but it does prevent due process objections from
successfully controlling the effect which the state of location gives
to the ex parte divorce. The change in Ohio law is a good example. In
1927 an Ohio court held that the state rendering an ex parte decree
could not project its jurisdiction into Ohio so as to bar the Ohio dower
interest of the divorced spouse3 7 However, in 1932 the legislature pro-
vided that all dower interest should terminate upon the granting of an
absolute divorce within or without the state.3" The implementation of
either of these views violates neither full faith and credit nor due
process.39 The trend is apparently toward holding that interests like
dower and curtesy as a matter of local law are no more than mere
possibilities which expire with the termination of the marriage.40 In
34 Barrett v. Failing, 111 U.S. 523 (1884) ; Rodgers v. Rodgers, 56 Kan. 483, 43 Pac.
779 (1896); Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 Pac. 1079 (1908); Restatement, Con-
flict of Laws §§ 223, 237, 248 (1934) ; 28 C.J.S. Dower § 53 (1941).
35 Pennoyer v. Neff, supra note 3; Fall v. Estin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909) ; Clouse v. Clouse,
185 Tenn. 666, 207 S.W.2d 576 (1948).
36 Goodman v. Gertsle, 158 Ohio St. 353, 109 N.E.2d 489 (1952); 2 Vernier § 96;
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 227 (1956).
37 Snyder v. Buckeye State Bldg. & Loan Co., 26 Ohio App. 166, 160 N.E. 37 (1927).
38 Ohio Rev. Code § 2103.02 (1953).
39 Goodman v. Gertsle, supra note 36.
40 Maynard v. Hill, supra note 2; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 93 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Fla.
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view of this trend and the already formulated rules which fit neatly into
the divisible divorce concept as enunciated in Estin and Vanderbilt, one
should expect little future litigation concerning the effect of ex parte
divorces upon dower and curtesy interests.
RIGHT TO CUSTODY
Custody over children presents an entirely different problem ...
[I]nsofar as the spouses' interests are concerned, the divorce may
terminate their relations with each other as husband and wife, but
it cannot terminate their relation to their children. They are still
parents.4 '
These words delineate an essential difference between the divisible
divorce problems of support or property and the problem of child
custody. It has never been asserted that the latter is in any way
affected by the granting of a divorce decree itself. It is true that courts
often speak of their power to make custody orders as an incident of the
divorce decree, but they could also make such orders in a wide variety
of other proceedings which could be instituted for the sole purpose of
determining custody.' Parental rights including custody are not in-
cidents of the marriage relation. They exist regardless of marriage.
Since divorce could never affect custody ipso facto, it would be a mis-
nomer to speak of "divisible divorce" in this regard. It is only because
the Supreme Court used Estin as authority in deciding May v. Ander-
son43 that the custody problem may be logically discussed in an article
otherwise dealing with divisible divorce.
In May v. Anderson, the wife and children left Wisconsin and went
to Ohio. Shortly thereafter the husband-father obtained an ex parte
divorce in Wisconsin where he was domiciled. The court also gave him
custody of the children. In a later habeas corpus proceeding in Ohio,
which tested only the legality of the custody order, the Supreme Court
held that Ohio was not required by the Constitution to give full faith
and credit to the Wisconsin custody order. The Court placed the
mother's right to custody of her children in the same category as that
of her right as a wife to support and, without more ado, said it could
not be cut off without personal jurisdiction over her. This reliance upon
Estin not only allowed the Court to eke out a decision with no analysis
of the over-all problems confronting it, but also interjected needless
confusion into one of the most complicated and insoluble conflict of
1950); Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866 (1950);
Graham v. Onderdonk, 33 N.J. 356, 164 A.2d 749 (1960); 28 C.J.S. Dower § 53 (1941).
41 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra note 19, at 421 n.1.
42 Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
43 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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laws situations existing. The confusion lies in treating the custody
problem like the support problem.
A woman's right to support is created by a state as an instrument
to aid that state in providing for her well-being. The state's interest
and the woman's welfare are identical. Estin and Vanderbilt protect
her right of support for the purpose of enhancing her state's protection
of her welfare. This is not true in regard to a possible right to custody
of a child. There the state's paramount interest is in the welfare of the
child. As parens patriae the state functions as the ultimate guardian
and protector of the child. 4 Whenever a custody question is litigated,
the state's interest in accomplishing what is best for the welfare of the
child must be in direct conflict with the asserted rights of at least one
of the parents. The interest of the state and the right of the parent
are antagonistic. Because furtherance of one of these interests does not
further the other, the custody problem is unlike the support problem.
The conflict of laws situation concerning custody is infinitely more
complicated. Not only must the competition of the various states which
claim an interest in the child be resolved, but the competition between
those states and the parent must also be resolved. This is not to say
that the result in May v. Anderson is wrong, but that reasoning which
equates the right of support with a right to custody is inadequate and
misleading.
Prior to May v. Anderson, the struggles of the state courts were
confined to the requisites for jurisdiction over the subject matter of
custody. One view promoted by Beale and Goodrich and adopted by
the Restatement was that only the state of the domicile of the child had
jurisdiction to make custody orders. 5 The theory was that custody
was a status or res which was located only in the state of domicile.
Since a child's domicile is determined by operation of law and was often
said to remain with the father no matter where the child was living,
44 The old common-law rule was that the father had the unequivocal right to the
control and custody of his child. In more recent times a mother's rights to control and
custody have been recognized. But it has been the unquestioned view in England by
statute (In re B's Settlement, [1940) 1 Ch. 54; Guardianship of Infants Act, 1925, 15 & 16
Geo. 5, c. 45, § 1) and in America by court decisions that the child's welfare is a
consideration paramount to any rights of the parents. Finlay v. Finlay, supra note 42;
2 Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 15.02 (2d ed. 1961 rev. vol.) ; 4 Vernier § 232; Wein-
man, "The Trial Judge Awards Custody," 10 Law and Contemp. Prob. 721 (1944).
45 Beckman v. Beckman, 358 Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566 (1949). See Annot., 4
A.L.R.2d 7, 13 (1949); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 117 (1934); 2 Beale, Conflict of
Laws § 144.3 (1935); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 136 (3rd ed. 1949); Stansbury,
"Custody and Maintenance Law Across State Lines," 10 Law and Contemp. Prob. 819,
820 (1944). The writer commends all readers to Stansbury's article. Although written
before May v. Anderson, supra note 43, it is still timely.
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many courts did not follow this view. They either adopted the more
modern view that residence sufficed for jurisdiction or interpreted the
child's domicile as the place where he resided regardless of the where-
abouts of the father.46 This view is more in accord with the tendency
to further a state's ability to protect and control domestic relations
within its boundaries and is practically necessary to accomplish the
state's function of guardian of children within its borders. Cardozo
stated it thus:
The jurisdiction of a state to regulate the custody of infants found
within its territory does not depend upon the domicil of its parents.
It has its origin in the protection that is due to the incompetent or
helpless. . . . For this, the residence of the child suffices, though
domicil may be elsewhere.47
Only a few cases seemed concerned with the necessity for personal
jurisdiction over the parents. In most of these instances where the
court held that it was without jurisdiction, the child was either not
domiciled or not present within the state .4  These were sensible deci-
sions solely from the point of view of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. If the child were not within the state and one parent was ab-
sent with him, it would be difficult to justify the state's present or
future concern with the child.
Once jurisdiction attached, it was generally held to continue so
long as the child was an unemancipated minor, and the court's orders
were modifiable upon changed circumstances.49 If the child went into
another state, jurisdiction over the subject matter of custody arose there
from the new domicile or residence of the child." Full faith and
credit problems seldom arose because either the original jurisdiction
was thought to be lost5 or, if continuing, the modifiable order was just
as modifiable in the second state. 52
The lack of litigation and writing concerned with necessity for
46 Wicks v. Cox, 146 Tex. 489, 208 S.W.2d 876 (1943). See cases collected in Annot.,
4 A.L.R.2d 7 (1949) and 9 A.L.R.2d 434, 438 (1950); Stansbury, supra note 45, at 823.
47 Finlay v. Finlay, supra note 42.
48 De La Montanya v. De La Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345 (1896); Weber v.
Redding, 200 Ind. 448, 163 N.E. 269 (1928), cited by the Court in May v. Anderson,
supra note 43; Steele v. Steele, 152 Miss. 365, 118 So. 721 (1928) ; Payton v. Payton, 29
N.M. 613, 225 Pac. 576 (1924) ; 2 Nelson, op cit. supra note 44, § 15.32.
49 Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Mylius v. Cargill, 19 N.M. 278, 142 Pac.
913 (1914); Wicks v. Cox, supra note 46; 2 Nelson, op. cit. supra note 44, § 15.35;
Stansbury, supra note 45, at 827.
GO State ex rel. Larson v. Larson, 198 Minn. 489, 252 N.W. 329 (1934); Wicks v.
Cox, supra note 46.
51 State ex rel. Larson v. Larson, supra note 50.
52 Halvey v. Halvey, supra note 49; Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962).
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personal jurisdiction over both parents is almost certainly attributable
to a feeling that the relationship between a state once found to be
legitimately concerned with a child within its borders and that child
was a sufficient basis for the state to act upon things affecting the child.
If this is, indeed, the reason that personal jurisdiction was largely
ignored, it is extremely unfortunate that this factor was not discussed
in May v. Anderson. There can be no doubt that this case brought the
personal rights of the parents to the fore, but it apparently ignored the
state's interest which for so many years and in so many cases was the
main question for the courts. Exactly what is the significance of
May v. Anderson?
One of the few things that can be said with certainty about May v.
Anderson is that it held that full faith and credit does not require the
state where the mother and children are residing to accept a custody
order made without personal jurisdiction of the mother in another
state when the children were not present. In his concurring opinion,
Frankfurter emphasized that this was the only thing decided and,
therefore, the decree could have been given effect without offending due
process.53 The Court found that the mother was not domiciled in Wis-
consin but it found it unnecessary to determine the childrens' legal
domicile because "even if it be with their father, that does not give
Wisconsin, certainly as against Ohio, the personal jurisdiction that it
must have in order to deprive their mother of her personal right to their
immediate possession." 4 It is the Court's phrase "certainly as against
Ohio" which makes the decision ambiguous. Except for that phrase, its
other language equating the mother's personal right to custody with
her right to alimony would lead one to interpret the decision as holding
that the Wisconsin order was invalid as a personal judgment without
personal jurisdiction. That phrase gives credence to Frankfurter's
explanation. His concurrence outlines the necessity of allowing the
state having an interest in the children to discharge its responsibility
without being foreclosed by a prior decree of another state. In subse-
quent federal cases the courts refer to this concurring opinion for an
explanation of what the case held.55 So long as an interpretation of this
type is adhered to, May v. Anderson may be a helpful steppingstone to
a thorough and much needed clarification of jurisdiction and full faith
and credit recognition of custody orders by the Supreme Court.
The case would have been in accord with the many state decisions
53 May v. Anderson, supra note 43, at 535.
54 Id. at 534.
55 In re Adoption of a Minor, 214 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Hopson v. Hopson,
221 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857
(D. Md. 1961).
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holding that a custody order is void without presence of the children
or personal jurisdiction of the parents if it had held that domicile alone
was not a sufficient jurisdictional basis to satisfy due process. But to
interpret the case as requiring personal jurisdiction of both parents in
order to make a valid custody order whether the children were present
or not, would be to unjustifiably protect the parental rights at the
expense of the state. It would unduly straightjacket a state in which
children were residing to prevent that state from controlling their well-
being unless the state were lucky enough to be able to obtain personal
jurisdiction over both parents. Such a decision would be contrary to
both the generally accepted concept that the state is the guardian of
children within its borders and the recently apparent policy of the
Supreme Court to further the state's ability to control its own domestic
relations. It is hoped that, in addition to its narrow holding, May v.
Anderson will serve only as a much needed reminder that rights of
parents are also involved in custody problems in conflict of laws.
The competition between states as to which should have jurisdic-
tion over custody matters was well on its way to a sensible solution in
state court decisions. Technical domicile was not exclusive. Since a
child may never be within the state of his technical domicile, it is ab-
surd to propose that that state has any concern with him. The state
courts have been rapidly moving to residence as the test. May v. Ander-
son has not dealt a death blow to domicile, but it certainly has demon-
strated that it is not only the state of domicile which may act.
Assuming that residence is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the state courts have also been moving toward an
acceptable solution of the conflicts problem when a child moves to an-
other state. Even if jurisdiction continues in the first state, the new
state now has the child and must be able to deal with him. As a matter
of policy the second state's interest is so great that it should not be re-
quired to give full faith and credit to the original order and thus fore-
close itself from acting. This is obviously what Frankfurter thought
May v. Anderson held. It is frankly an exception to the requirements
of full faith and credit and should be used cautiously only when really
necessary in the second state.56
The competition between the parent and the state which exists in
custody cases but not in the support cases must be resolved on a basis
fitting to it. The state's interest in the care and well-being of the child
and the need of a minor for the state's protection constitute a rela-
tionship of sufficient substance to recognize that the state deals with
56 For a discussion of the workability of such a view, see Stansbury, supra note
45, at 830.
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this relationship and not merely in personam on the parent when it
makes custody orders. If the need for controlling marital status was
enough to permit ex parte determinations, the practical need in regard
to the status of helpless children is infinitely more so. This does not
mean that the parent and his rights are, to be ignored. They are valu-
able and precious rights. Due process requires that he be given every
opportunity reasonable under the circumstances to assert his rights.
The problem is akin to that in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.17 In that case it was necessary for the state of New York
to supervise and control accounting of common trust funds in the state,
the beneficiaries of which were often nonresidents. The result of the
court procedure for periodic settlements was that the nonresident bene-
ficiaries were deprived of property rights and of the opportunity to
make personal claims against the trustees. The Supreme Court stated
that a classification as an in rem proceeding was not necessary, but
that it was sufficient to observe that "the interest of each state in pro-
viding means to close trusts . . . is so insistent and rooted in custom as
to establish beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the in-
terests of all claimants, resident or non-resident, provided its procedure
accords full opportunity to appear and be heard.15 8 It added that the
fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard. It
then dismissed mere publication of notice as inadequate, partly because
the caretaker of the beneficiaries' interests could not be relied upon to
pass the notice on to the beneficiaries since in the proceedings he be-
came the beneficiaries' adversary. (The parent who has control of the
child within the jurisdiction is in much the same relationship to the
absent parent.) The Court held that due process would be satisfied by
actual notice mailed to the beneficiaries whose addresses are known.
The Mullane case is similar to the situation of a child resident within
a state which must supervise and control that child. Like the trust
beneficiaries, it is unlikely that the address of a parent who had any
concern for the child would be unknown. The interests of the state in
discharging its responsibility toward the child and the interests of the
absent parent can only be accommodated through a reasonable compro-
mise such as this which allows the state to act upon the child's status,
but affords a reasonable chance for the absent parent to assert his
rights by assuring as certainly as can reasonably be done that he is given
notice of the proceeding.
A century ago this was the over-all solution which Judge Cooley
must have had in mind when he discussed jurisdiction over divorce,
57 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
58 Id. at 313.
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custody, and alimony. He said that service by publication would be
sufficient for terminating marriage and perhaps "to pass upon the ques-
tion of the custody and control of the children of the marriage, if they
were then within its jurisdiction. But a decree on this subject would
only be absolutely binding on the parties while the children remained
within the jurisdiction." He continued by saying that personal jurisdic-
tion would be necessary for an alimony decree so that if the decree were
ex parte, the remedy would be confined to dissolution of the marriage
"and to an order for the custody of the children, if within the state."' 9
All the theoretical tools necessary for such a solution are at hand; the
need is to convince the Court that the practical necessities of our times
require it. If there is any connection at all between divisible divorce
litigation and that of conflict of laws in child custody matters, it is that
not only the considerations expressed in Estin and Vanderbilt as to
personal rights, but also those expressed in Williams I as to the state's,
interest must be given due weight in order to reach a decision which
combines both expediency and fairness.
59 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 405 (1868).
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